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1 Introduction
Apprenticeship training is believed to be a very effi-
cient form of training, providing skills to young peo-
ple, so that they have fewer problems in the transi-
tion into the labor market, e.g. OECD (2000).1 The
precondition for an apprenticeship training system
operating successfully is, however, that there is a suf-
ficiently large number of firms willing to train young
people. The factors influencing the willingness of
firms to provide training have been analyzed in a
limited number of empirical studies. This study adds
to the existing literature by analyzing the firms’
training decisions with the help of data on regional
labor market conditions and the structure of the re-
gional education system.
This paper contributes to the literature on training
in different ways. Firstly, regional variance in the
data is used within one national training system.
This is an advantage because local effects on the
training decision can be captured, which would not
be possible if the analysis were performed at na-
tional level. Furthermore, unobserved time effects,
which would almost certainly be present in a longi-
tudinal study, can be avoided. Secondly, this study
differs from the few existing studies using data at
regional level, e.g. Brunello and de Paola (2004),
Brunello and Gambarotto (2004) or Niederalt
(2005), by using travel distances rather than political
borders in defining the regional area. Thirdly, a rep-
resentative firm-level data set is at our disposal
which has been designed explicitly to analyze ques-
tions related to the training decisions of firms. This
enables us to make use of detailed information that
is relevant in this context, such as variables concern-
ing the number of skilled workers in the training
occupation of (potential) apprentices as well as the
retention and quit rates of apprentices in training
firms. Two main questions are addressed in this pa-
per. Firstly, we analyze the effect that the possibil-
ity of trained workers quitting after completion of
training has on the training decision, using informa-
tion about the local industry structure. And sec-
ondly, the impact of the ability of potential apprenti-
ces on the training decision is analyzed by using dif-
ferent proxy variables, which also contributes to the
existing literature. Both sets of information, industry
structure and the supply of school-leavers, show a
large degree of regional variation and are therefore
suited to use in an inter-regional comparison.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 briefly
describes the Swiss apprenticeship system. Section 3
1 There is evidence that apprenticeship training is even efficient
in countries where this form of training has a lesser tradition, see
e.g. Bonnal et al. (2002).
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discusses the theory on firm training and presents
the testable empirical hypotheses. Section 4 intro-
duces the data and the sample design. In Section 5,
the training probability of firms is estimated and the
results are discussed. Section 6 concludes.
2 The apprenticeship system in
Switzerland
The apprenticeship system is still the backbone of
the upper secondary level education system in Ger-
man-speaking countries. In Switzerland, about
60 percent of young people who have completed
compulsory schooling choose an apprenticeship
training program each year. The so-called “dual-ed-
ucation” provides them with formal and on-the-job
training within their firm, and one to two days of
formal schooling in a vocational school. The two
main types of apprenticeship training program last
either three or four years. As an alternative to the
apprenticeship training, young people completing
their compulsory schooling can also opt to remain
in full-time education at upper secondary level. Al-
most half of the remaining 40 percent of young peo-
ple who do not choose an apprenticeship program
attend grammar school (Gymnasium), which pre-
pares them for university and a more academic ca-
reer. Although one of the virtues of the apprentice-
ship system is its inclusiveness for not so academi-
cally inclined school-leavers (Switzerland has one of
the lowest percentages of the over-16 population
that has not attended any form of non-compulsory
schooling in the OECD), apprentices can qualify for
further education at tertiary level. The proportion
of apprentices continuing their education at tertiary
level has risen steadily over the last decade. From
the perspective of an individual educational career,
an apprenticeship training is therefore in no way a
dead end.
Apprentices graduate with a diploma recognized
throughout Switzerland which certifies their profes-
sional qualification. The national certification and
the substantial share of formal education during the
training program gives the apprentices a guarantee
of vertical and horizontal mobility after they have
completed their training. The quality of the training
provided in Switzerland is recognized internation-
ally as meeting the highest standards. International
comparisons show, in terms of scholastic and profes-
sional qualifications, that Swiss apprentices are
more than a match for their upper secondary level
peers who attend school full-time (Bierhoff and
Prais 1997).
The employment period ends automatically on com-
pletion of training. Any extension of the employ-Samuel Muehlemann and Stefan C. Wolter Regional Effects on Employer-Provided Training
ment period must be negotiated in a separate con-
tract. Mobility is fairly high among young people
who complete their apprenticeships, with only
36 percent still working at their original training site
one year later (Schweri et al. 2003).2
3 Theory
This section summarizes the theory of the firms’ de-
cisions to train apprentices and generates the testa-
ble hypotheses about the factors that influence the
firms’ behavior. We begin by briefly discussing the
implications of human capital theory and its refine-
ments on the decision of firms to train apprentices.
Then the paper addresses the question of how the
expectations of firms about the ability of apprentices
influences the training decision.
3.1 Competitive vs. frictional labor
markets
According to classical human capital theory, firms
will not pay for general training if the labor market
is competitive (Becker 1964). Recent training litera-
ture, however, has focused on the reasons why firms
might pay for general training of their workers,
which is a frequently observed phenomenon and
contradicts human capital theory. The main result of
this literature states that a firm is willing to pay for
general training if there is a positive probability that
the apprentice will remain within the firm after the
training period and that he will accept a wage below
his productivity, at least for some time. The neces-
sary condition for this to happen is that there are
frictions in the labor market. Frictions give the train-
ing firms enough monopsony power to keep their
trainees from switching to a competitor, even if the
training firm is paying a wage below the trainees’
productivity. In addition, the difference between
wage and productivity must be higher for skilled
workers than for unskilled workers (Acemoglu and
Pischke (1998, 1999) refer to this as a compressed
wage structure), otherwise firms would still not have
an incentive to invest in training their workforce. A
compressed wage structure occurs if there are, for
example, search costs, asymmetric information,
firm-specific human capital, efficiency wages, mini-
mum wages or other wage floors. Although a com-
pressed wage structure induces firms to pay for gen-
eral training, there will still be under-investment be-
2 In Germany, the corresponding figure is closer to 70 percent,
see Winkelmann (1996) or Euwals and Winkelmann (2002).
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cause not all returns to training are internalized.
Stevens (1994) also shows that if the trained skills
are transferable, there will be externalities leading
to under-investment in training. For a comprehen-
sive summary of the literature on firm training see
Leuven (2005).
The labor market in Switzerland is considered to be
rather competitive by international standards.
Hence, one would expect that the costs of an ap-
prenticeship training program would have to be
borne by the apprentices themselves in order for
firms to provide training. Consistent with this hy-
pothesis, a Swiss survey shows that on average, an
apprenticeship program results in a net profit for the
training firm (Wolter and Schweri 2002). In other
words, the productive contribution of an average ap-
prentice is high enough to cover the company’s
training expenses and the salary of the apprentice.
Hence, the possibility to cover all training expenses
already within the contract period of the apprentice-
ship program is a necessary condition for firms to
offer training posts in the context of a highly com-
petitive labor market.3 However, not all firms have
the structure which would guarantee that their ex-
penses were covered if they decided to train appren-
tices. Wolter et al. (2006) show that differences in
the expected net costs of training during the training
period can explain why a large number of firms de-
cide not to train apprentices. Finally, Muehlemann
et al. (2005) show that the elasticity with which firms
react to the expected net costs of training is substan-
tial for the training decision, yet the provision of
apprenticeship positions by training firms would not
be increased by a marginal reduction in the net costs
of training. Despite the observation that an average
apprenticeship program has no uncovered training
expenses at the end of the training period, about a
third of training companies face positive net costs
after an apprentice has completed training. There-
fore, at least some of the training companies must
be able to use frictions in the labor market to recoup
their training expenses. The hypothesis tested in this
paper is that within a region, a larger number of
firms in the same industry will lower the likelihood
of a firm training apprentices. We argue that an in-
creasing number of competitors that are geographi-
cally close will increase the probability of the
trained workers leaving the training company.4 The
3 Consistent with these findings for Switzerland, research in Ger-
many, where labor market frictions are high, has shown that on
average training firms have substantial net costs after training
(Beicht et al. 2004).
4 Franz and Zimmermann (2002) showed for Germany that out-
side options have a significant influence on the probability of ap-
prentices leaving the training company after the apprenticeship
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reason for this is the danger that the training com-
pany can lose its trained workers, and the training
companies will have a lower probability of making
a gain by paying wages below productivity once the
training is completed.
Overall, firms only provide apprenticeships if it is
already profitable during the training period or if
they are able to recoup their investments after the
training period.
3.2 The expected ability of apprentices
The expected ability of apprentices is of twofold in-
terest for training companies. On the one hand,
more able school-leavers will lower the net costs of
training, because they need fewer training hours to
reach the required training levels. On the other
hand, if a company decides to employ an apprentice
after training, and labor market frictions allow the
company to pay wages below productivity, the gain
is higher in the case of more able workers (appren-
tices). In line with these hypotheses, one would ex-
pect that the easier it is for a company to recruit
able school-leavers, the more likely it will decide to
engage in training. Since we cannot directly observe
an apprentice’s ability, we will test three types of
proxy variable. Each of them varies substantially be-
tween regions, should theoretically have an inde-
pendent impact on the training decision and should
therefore be suitable for our empirical analysis. For
the first variable, we argue that the number of young
people of school-leaving age (within a region)5 per
company is a proxy for the quality of the match be-
tween apprentices and training firms. If there are
more young people per firm, then a firm should also
find more suitable applicants to fill their training
posts. Therefore, irrespective of the average quality
of school-leavers in a region, the number of people
of school-leaving age per firm in a region should in-
crease the quality of the match. Secondly, PISA tests
(OECD 2002, 2004) have shown that pupils with a
foreign mother tongue are on average less well-qual-
ified than native speakers. As a proxy for this effect,
the share of pupils of foreign nationality in the re-
gion is used to capture the average quality of poten-
tial apprentices. Thirdly, the structure of the educa-
tion system at upper secondary level is taken into
account. It is assumed that the existence of a well
5 We do not have exact data on the number of school-leavers per
district. Therefore we approximate this figure with the number of
young people aged between 15Ð19. This approximation makes
sense as not all school-leavers start their apprenticeships immedi-
ately after completion of compulsory schooling.
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developed full-time upper secondary school system
in the region will attract the more able young people
into these forms of education and detract them from
apprenticeship training. Full-time schooling pro-
grams require a costly infrastructure, so they are re-
gionally concentrated, and not all pupils have the
same access to these programs because they might
live in a more secluded region. Furthermore, be-
cause the infrastructure cannot be adjusted at will in
the short run, there are fluctuations in the admission
requirements due to demographic changes. At times
when many young people finish compulsory school-
ing at the same time, admission requirements rise
because the schools have a limited number of class-
rooms and teachers available. In contrast, if the
number of young people completing compulsory
schooling is low, then it will be easier to enroll in a
full-time upper secondary program, since the school
might not want to lay off teachers or leave a lot of
classrooms empty. Furthermore, because the aca-
demically oriented programs (grammar schools) at
upper secondary level offer high social prestige,
these programs are generally preferred to appren-
ticeship programs (at least by the parents of young
people of school-leaving age). One can assume that
if the infrastructure for full-time upper secondary
schooling is well developed in a region, a training
firm in that region will have a smaller pool of able
applicants for an apprenticeship program. Conse-
quently, full-time schooling programs will have an
exogenous effect on the firms’ training decision. As
a proxy for the size of the full-time schooling offer
in a region, we use the share of young people com-
pleting compulsory education that opted for gram-
mar schools in 1995.6
4 Data
4.1 Survey design and data
The data used here is from a representative survey
conducted in Swiss firms in the year 2001 by the
Center for Research in Economics of Education at
the University of Berne and the Swiss Federal Sta-
tistical Office.7 The original data set contains
2352 training firms and 2230 non-training firms, but
firms that cannot make independent decisions about
6 As the firm survey covers training and non-training firms at the
end of the year 2000, the earliest possible data of an apprentice
being hired is the year 1996. It is assumed that the grammar
school rate in previous years is not correlated with unobservable
effects on the training decision in later years, and can therefore
be treated as an exogenous variable.
7 For details on the survey characteristics see Wolter and Schweri
(2002).Samuel Muehlemann and Stefan C. Wolter Regional Effects on Employer-Provided Training
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training, because they are part of a larger enterprise,
were excluded.8 Furthermore, firms that operate in
the whole country and use a centralized training
scheme were excluded from the sample. The final
data set used in this paper has a total of 4090 firms.
Detailed data on the number of workers, skilled
workers in the (potential) training occupation, train-
ing occupation, retention and quit rates of apprenti-
ces and the personnel situation is available at firm
level (see Table 1).
4.2 Regional labor markets
We have constructed regional labor markets to ac-
commodate the geographical structure of Switzer-
land. Since Switzerland is a small country with 26
cantons, it is likely that economic activities take
place across the borders of cantons, especially in
small cantons (see Figure 1 for a map of the cantons
of Switzerland).
The regions are defined as follows: the largest Swiss
cities and towns are taken as the centers of a region.
Then, all towns and districts that could be reached
8 The results do not change if public firms are excluded from the
sample.
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within half an hour by car constitute the area of a
specific region.9 In total there are 67 different re-
gions10 that cover all of the country; especially in
densely populated areas, the regions may overlap
(see Figure 2).
It should be noted that a firm always belongs to a
single region. If a firm is situated in an overlapping
area between two regional centers, then it will be-
long to the region whose town center is closer. The
“overlapping” regions are only relevant for the con-
struction of the independent variables, such as the
number of potential firms that could poach an ap-
prentice or the supply of young people. To illustrate
this, consider a young school-leaver that lives in an
overlapping area between two regions with town A
and town B as the center of each region. The young
person is able to travel to either of the towns in less
9 To measure the traveling time, we used the software “Microsoft
Autoroute 2005”.
10 The number of regions was determined by the number of suffi-
ciently large towns in Switzerland that can constitute an inde-
pendent center of economic activity. Independent means that the
region can not simply be seen as a sub-region of a larger region.
These centers are also characterized by the fact that they have
their own VET schools where apprentices can be educated. To a
certain extent the exact number of regions remains arbitrary be-
cause some larger regions could have been further subdivided.
However, in these cases, the sub-regions would have become too
small to constitute a meaningful entity.Samuel Muehlemann and Stefan C. Wolter Regional Effects on Employer-Provided Training
than thirty minutes and could therefore potentially
be hired by firms in the center of region A or the
center of region B. Thus, that young person influ-
ences the training decisions of firms in both regions,
which in turn justifies the construction of overlap-
ping regions.
If regions did not overlap, a person living on the
border of a region would by assumption only be of
importance for firms in the same region, but not for
a firm that might be much closer to the place of
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residence, but in another region. By the use of travel
distances and the construction of overlapping re-
gions we can overcome this drawback.11
This definition of a region thus captures the eco-
nomic and geographical reality in a much better way
11 Of course it would be optimal to construct a region including
the supply of young people, the number of potential poaching
firms, etc. for each firm in our sample, but it is doubtful whether
the construction of over 4,000 individual regions would improve
the analysis substantially.Regional Effects on Employer-Provided Training Samuel Muehlemann and Stefan C. Wolter
than using political and administrative entities, such
as cantons or districts. For each region, all relevant
data was collected at community level, then aggre-
gated to the regional level and finally matched to
our data set. The variables include the number of
firms within an industry, the population size by age
group, the number of pupils and their origin as well
as the number of students at different levels of sec-
ondary education (see Table 2 for descriptive statis-
tics). Variables about expected future revenue, pro-
ductivity, competitiveness, profit, growth of the com-
pany and technical state of the infrastructure were
included in the initial estimations but they did not
show any significant influence on the firms’ training
decisions. These results are therefore not reported
in the paper.
5 Econometric models and empirical
analysis
In order to estimate the effect of our variables of
interest on the training decision, different probit bi-
nary choice models are used. Since the observations
within a certain region are likely to be more similar
than between different regions, the estimation pro-
cedure has to accommodate this type of data struc-
ture. First, a probit model with cluster-robust stan-
dard errors is estimated with different specifications
for the explanatory variables.12 Then we also esti-
mate a model with dummy variables for each canton
in Switzerland to account for the possibility that
there might be canton-specific effects influencing
the firms’ training decisions. Finally, a random ef-
fects probit model is estimated to account for possi-
ble unobserved heterogeneity between different re-
gions.13
5.1 Estimation of the effects on the
training decision
We assume that the decision to provide training de-
pends on firm characteristics j and on some regional
variables r. Let
12 We assume that there is no spatial correlation between regions.
It is further assumed that the within-cluster unobservables are
uncorrelated with the regressors. In this case, it is sufficient to
adjust the standard errors of the regression coefficients, because
the point estimates of the coefficients themselves are still valid.
To estimate the regression models, we make use of the “cluster”
command implemented in Stata. For a detailed treatment of data
with a cluster structure, see e.g. Cameron and Trivedi (2006: 829).
All assumptions hold for all of the estimated models in this paper.
13 We do not estimate a model with regional dummy variables
because, with the exception of the variable “number of firms”, all
of the other independent regional variables have no variance
within a region. The inclusion of a regional dummy variable
would therefore in many cases capture most of the effect of the
variables of interest.
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yjr =
1 if firm j trains
0 if firm j does not train
then the probability that a firm provides training is
P(yjr =1 Nxjr)=P(y*
jr >0 Nxjr)=Φ(xjr ),
j =1,...4090; r =1,...67
where Φ(·) is the standard normal cdf.14 We use the
following specification for the training decision:
yjr =1[ x jr  + εjr <0 ]
where xjr contains regional variables r concerning
the number of firms in a certain industry, the num-
ber of young people aged 15 to 19 within a region
per firm, the percentage of young people aged be-
tween 15 and 19 at grammar school and the percent-
age of pupils at elementary school that have a non-
native mother tongue.
In addition, there are variables at firm level j about
the firm size, number of skilled workers in the train-
ing occupation, firm ownership, industry, training
occupation and a variable indicating whether the
firm has difficulties in recruiting skilled workers on
the external labor market.
5.2 Results
5.2.1 The influence of the number of firms
within a region
The results show that the number of firms in a re-
gional labor market has a significant and negative
effect on the provision of training. The firm effect is
largest when we exclude the other regional variables
that are available (Model 1 of Table 3). The training
decision of firms responds to the number of firms
per industry in a region with an elasticity of Ð0.19.15
In other words, the effect of a 10% increase in the
number of firms in the region and industry reduces
the training probability by 1.9%.16 Once the num-
14 The probit random effects model assumes that the region-spe-
cific effects are normally distributed, with αr  N[0,σ2
α], where
the standard normal cdf now takes the form Φ(αr + x jr ) (for
more details, see e.g. Cameron and Trivedi (2006: 795)).
15 All elasticities reported in the text are significantly different
from zero. For reasons of space they are not shown specifically in
Table 3.
16 The average training probability in the sample is 29.8%, see
also Table 1 in the appendix.Samuel Muehlemann and Stefan C. Wolter Regional Effects on Employer-Provided Training
ber of young people and the schooling variables
are introduced, the firm effect becomes smaller
but remains negative and significant. In our pre-
ferred specification (Model 4 of Table 3), a 10%
increase in the number of firms reduces the train-
ing probability by 1%. Therefore it can be argued
that the outside options for workers are important
ZAF 2 und 3/2007 143
for a firm’s training decision, at least at regional
level.17 Our results are in line with the findings of
17 It should be noted that the inclusion of the dummy variable
“large metropolitan area” does not influence the results. This is
an indication that our explanatory variables should in fact reflect
the effects that are interpreted above.Regional Effects on Employer-Provided Training Samuel Muehlemann and Stefan C. Wolter
Harhoff and Kane (1997), Brunello and de Paola
(2004), Brunello and Gambarotto (2004). The effect
of the number of firms in a region is somewhat
smaller if the cantonal dummy variables are in-
cluded (Table 5) and of similar magnitude but only
marginally significant using the random effects
model (Table 6).
A further indication that the number of firms within
a region influences the training decision can be
found by analyzing only the training firms. We find
that a firm is more likely to suffer from a high exog-
enous quit rate if there are more firms in the same
144 ZAF 2 und 3/2007Samuel Muehlemann and Stefan C. Wolter Regional Effects on Employer-Provided Training
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industry within a region; although the effect is only
marginally significant, a 10% increase in the num-
ber of firms increases the probability of a high exog-
enous quit rate by 2 percentage points (Table 4).18
5.2.2 The influence of the firms’ expectations
regarding the ability of apprentices
As discussed in section 3.2, the effect of apprentices’
abilities on firm behavior cannot be observed di-
rectly. Instead, proxy variables for the firms’ expec-
tations about the ability of potential apprentices are
used. We find that these variables are important de-
terminants of a firm’s decision process. The size of
the cohort, the quality of pupils and the structure of
the education system influence the training deci-
sions of firms significantly.
First, the number of young people per firm within a
region and industry has a significant and positive ef-
fect on training. If the number of young people in-
creases by 10%, then the training probability of a
firm increases by 0.8% (see Model 4 in Table 3).
The reason why the number of young people has a
separate effect on the training decision is the im-
proved matching between firms and candidates. If a
firm has a larger pool of applicants, then it is more
likely that there will be somebody suitable amongst
those who apply for an apprenticeship. This effect is
also significant and positive in the model with can-
ton dummy variables (Table 5), whereas the effect is
smaller but still significant in the random effects
model. In addition, the findings are in line with a
longitudinal study conducted in Switzerland by
Müller and Schweri (2006), who find a positive ef-
fect of the population of 16-year-old school-leavers
on the firms’ training decisions. Hence, the effect
of demographic changes on firms’ training decisions
seems to be quite robust.
Second, firms are less likely to provide training in
regions with a well developed full-time school sys-
tem at upper secondary level. Again, firms expect
the ability of an average applicant to be lower, be-
cause the more able pupils are more likely to opt
for full-time schooling instead of a (sophisticated)
apprenticeship training program when they reach
the age at which this decision has to be made. The
results show that an increase in the ratio of the high
school enrolment rate by 10 percentage points de-
creases the training probability by 3.8 percentage
points (Model 4, Table 3). The effects are of similar
18 The quit rate within a firm is a binary variable defined as high
if at least half of the trained apprentices quit the firm after train-
ing, despite the firm offering them contracts as skilled workers.Regional Effects on Employer-Provided Training Samuel Muehlemann and Stefan C. Wolter
magnitude in the model with canton dummy vari-
ables as well as the random effects model, although
not significant at the 5 % level in the canton fixed
effects model. Third, an increase in the percentage
of foreign children in elementary schools reduces
the training provision of firms. If a firm is located
within a region in which more than 20 % of the pu-
pils in elementary schools are foreigners, then the
training probability is reduced by 5.6 percentage
points (Model 4, Table 3). This reflects the fact that
firms expect higher training costs because of the
lower ability of the average potential apprentice,
which is in line with the results from student pupil
achievement tests, e.g. OECD (2002, 2004). This ef-
fect is also negative and significant in both the ran-
dom effects model and the model with canton fixed
effects.
In conclusion, it can be shown that the firms’ expec-
tations about the ability of apprentices influences
their training decisions. The behavior of training
firms (Table 4) also seems to be consistent with the
model of Acemoglu and Pischke (1998), which pre-
dicts that a firm only keeps on an apprentice as a
skilled worker if his/her ability is above some mini-
mum threshold. The variable used to approximate
ability is the average relative productivity of the
firm’s apprentices in the last year of the training pro-
gram. The results show that the lower the relative
productivity, the higher the probability that a firm
does not keep on their apprentices after training.19
After the inclusion of regional variables, the effects
of the firm-level variables are similar to previous
studies, e.g. Muehlemann et al. (2005) or Wolter et
al. (2006).20 The number of skilled workers in the
occupation to be trained in a firm has a very strong
and positive influence on the training decision. A
10% increase in the number of skilled workers leads
to a 5.57% increase in the probability of training
apprentices (or an elasticity of 0.569), which is quite
substantial. Firm size has an additional impact; given
the number of skilled workers, small firms are still
less likely to train apprentices. The reason for this
behavior could be that small firms face a higher un-
certainty about the quality of an apprentice and his
quit behavior (small firms are usually the last in the
chain when school-leavers apply for apprentice-
ships). At the same time, they are very often too
small and too specialized to provide all the required
19 The dependent variable “high layoffs” is defined as a binary
variable with the value 1 if more than 50% of apprentices are not
kept on in a firm.
20 The following results are marginal effects or elasticities from
Model 4 in Table 3, which is our preferred specification. For rea-
sons of space, these figures are not reported in a separate table.
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training lessons and contents at reasonable costs. In
addition, a firm with problems in recruiting workers
on the external labor market has a 9.2 percentage
point higher probability of training apprentices. Fur-
thermore, firms in the construction sector have a
7.5 percentage point higher training probability, and
firms in public administration are 10 percentage
points more likely to train apprentices.
The only important difference to the studies cited
above is that the effect of language regions in Swit-
zerland disappears once we control for the structure
of the education system. It is precisely the more de-
veloped upper secondary school system in the
French part of Switzerland that is in competition
with the dual education system. Due to the fact that
a larger proportion of more able pupils at the age
of 15Ð16 continues a school-based education, the
expected training costs of an apprentice are higher
in the French part and thus the average training
probability is lower.
6 Concluding remarks
The results described in this paper provide insights
indicating that regional aspects of the labor market
and the education system influence the training de-
cision of firms. The factors singled out in the analysis
have several consequences for policy making.
The negative effect of a high density of firms (in the
same industry) on the likelihood of training appren-
tices underlines the importance of training regula-
tions. Firms need to be able to train apprentices in
a cost-efficient manner if the labor markets are com-
petitive. Otherwise, firms will not engage in training,
because the probability of recouping the training ex-
penses after the training period would be too low.
The variables related to the supply of potential ap-
prentices have several implications. Firstly, the qual-
ity of the school system directly impacts the cost-
benefit ratio of an apprenticeship program. There-
fore, measures which improve the competencies of
school-leavers will affect the apprenticeship training
system positively. Secondly, the importance of a
large number of potential applicants for the training
decision of firms indicates that the current problems
that a fraction of school-leavers experience when
trying to find an apprenticeship will not automati-
cally be solved due to future demographic changes.
The predicted reduction in the number of school-
leavers will result in a lower number of applicants
for an apprenticeship per firm. Hence, the probabil-
ity of a good match between the firm and the ap-Samuel Muehlemann and Stefan C. Wolter Regional Effects on Employer-Provided Training
prentice will be lower, and thereby the likelihood
of a firm providing apprenticeships will be reduced.
Finally, the public investments in full-time schooling
options at upper secondary level are Ð intentionally
or not Ð a threat to the dual apprenticeship training
system. The more attractive and accessible full-time
schooling programs are, the more difficult it will be
for firms to find apprentices with sufficiently high
competencies. Therefore, even schooling programs
that were initially created to solve cyclical imbal-
ances on the apprenticeship market can cause the
destruction of apprenticeship posts in the long run.
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